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WOMEN'S RETIREMENT INCOME AND THE
THREE-LEGGED STOOL
Edith U Fierst *
A woman's experience in old age is different from that of a man.
Women live longer; this remains true even when their worklives resem-
ble those of men in duration and stress.' Because women usually out-
live their husbands, they are more frequently alone in old age.
Furthermore, during those years women are much poorer than men. In
1980, for example, the median income of females sixty-five years old
and over was $4,226, compared with $7,342 for men the same age.2
Although many factors contribute to women's poverty in old age,
one major cause is that most women spend many years as homemakers.
In fact, many women in today's retired population have been lifelong
homemakers. Even those who worked for pay during substantial parts
of their lives worked at home for long periods. Both lifelong and occa-
sional homemakers lost retirement income accumulated in their own
right when they were out of the paid labor force, retirement income
that frequently was not replaced by support provided by their
husbands.
An indication of the seriousness of the problem can be found in the
following figures: In 1977, when the poverty level for an elderly indi-
vidual living alone was $2,906,3 28.4% of women sixty-five and over
living alone had incomes less than that amount.
Retirement income has traditionally been viewed as a three-legged
stool: one leg is Social Security, the second, private pensions, and the
third, savings. This article will attempt to update that perception from
the point of view of women,' focusing on the reasons for women's pov-
* Attorney in private practice in Washington, D.C. Ms. Fierst served as Staff Advisor on wo-
men's retirement income and health insurance to the White House's Interdepartmental Task
Force on Women from April, 1979 to January, 1981. B.A., Barnard College; LL.B., George
Washington University.
I. GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, OLDER WOMEN: THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 1, 2 (Oct.
1980) (published by the Women's Studies Program and Policy Center of George Washington
University in conjunction with the Women's Research and Education Institute of the Con-
gresswomen's Caucus). For a somewhat different analysis, see Key, Sex-Based Pension Plans
in Perspective." City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 2 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 3 (1979).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Ser.
P-60, No. 127, MONEY, INCOME, AND POVERTY STATUS OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE
U.S.: 1981, table 8 (1981) [hereinafter cited as MONEY, INCOME, AND POVERTY STATUS].
3. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1979, table 756, at 461 (100th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT].
4. Id. table 763, at 464.
5. It is conventional to omit from the "stool" two other possible legs, earned income and wel-
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erty in old age. It will also suggest some helpful changes in retirement
systems.
SOCIAL SECURITY AND OTHER GOVERNMENT PENSIONS
The three-legged stool is extremely lopsided today with benefits
provided by the federal government, primarily Social Security, bearing
most of the burden of supporting women in their old age. In 1976 88%
of unmarried women over age sixty-five were entitled to Social Secur-
ity,6 and 60% had no other income.7
Social Security is preeminent as a source of income not only be-
cause so many women depend upon it but also because it is regularly
adjusted upward to keep pace with the cost of living.8 Few other forms
of retirement income are commensurably increased.9 It is difficult to
exaggerate the importance of cost-of-living increases in retirement ben-
efits. During the 1970's living costs increased at an average annual rate
of 7.4%. As a result, by 1980 those who retired in 1970 experienced
more than a 50% decrease in the value of any retirement income that
was not indexed.'" The importance of Social Security has become even
greater as the rate of inflation has accelerated in recent years, to a
figure in excess of 11% in 1980."1
Federal employees are generally not covered by Social Security but
instead receive indexed federal pensions; these also take the place of
staff pensions, and, therefore, for long-term employees are larger than
fare, although both are important sources of income for the elderly. They are not discussed
here but should not be forgotten.
6. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITy: THE CHANGING
ROLES OF MEN AND WOMEN 177 (1979) [hereinafter cited as THE CHANGING ROLES OF
MEN AND WOMEN].
7. Id. at 183.
8. Social Security's indexing is accomplished by application of two separate formulas. During
the employee's working years, his or her entitlement (and that of any spouse who will ulti-
mately be entitled in the capacity of spouse) increases in accord with the average earnings of
covered workers. 42 U.S.C. § 430 (Supp. III 1979). After retirement, benefit increases are
provided which keep pace with the cost ofliving. 42 U.S.C. § 415(i) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
Because of the unusual inflation and low productivity of recent years, wages have been in-
creasing at a slower rate than the cost of living, with the result that retired persons have been
getting higher increases than have workers, a discrepancy many people think unfair to the
working population. This difference is part of the reason for Social Security's current deficit
posit (nother factor is high unemployment; the Social Security tax is paid only by the
employed.) For these reasons Congress may change the indexing pattern of Social Security
benefits. Even if this should happen, however, Social Security benefits will continue to rise
with inflation.
9. Private pensions are not fully indexed, and it is unreasonable to expect private employers to
shoulder the risk of protecting their retirees against inflation because of the impossibility of
predicting the rate of inflation in the years ahead. The potential expense of the unknowable
is too great for employers to assume. Some employers do, however, provide ad hoc increases
to retirees. For a discussion of the relative importance of Social Security and private pen-
sions, see J. BRITTAIN, PRIVATE PENSIONS AND THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE ELDERLY
(1979) (prepared by the Brookings Institution under contract with the Pension and Welfare
Benefits Program, U.S. Dep't of Labor).
10. Data on inflation is obtained from STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 3, table 780, at 476.
11. The cost-of-living increase in Social Security, which is effective July, 1981 and corresponds
to price inflation, is 11.2%.
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Social Security alone. Most federal pensions are based upon the em-
ployee's average salary for the three highest earning years, keeping en-
titlements relatively current with inflation for those who continue in
federal employment until the date of retirement. Those who leave
before retirement, however, are not protected against inflation between
the time of resignation and the date of eligibility for pension payments.
This in itself works as a significant deterrent to federal employees
against changing jobs. 2
After retirement, federal pensions are raised once a year in accord-
ance with increases in the cost of living. 13
In comparison, state and local pensions, if indexed at all, are gener-
ally only partially indexed, typically with a limit of 3% to 5% per
annum. 14
Unfortunately, many women are ineligible for either Social Secur-
ity or a federal pension. Those omitted include women who are not
covered by Social Security as a result of either their own work or mar-
riage to a covered worker. They fall within one of the following five
categories:
First, homemakers widowed by federal employees who did not pro-
vide them with survivor annuities. The decision whether to provide a
survivor annuity is the employee's at the moment of retirement; how-
ever, as a result of legislation in 19 80,I" a federal employee who wishes
to elect not to provide a survivor annuity may do so only with the writ-
ten and witnessed acknowledgement of his or her spouse.
Second, divorced homemakers whose former husbands worked for
federal agencies, 16 including those whose deceased former husbands
were civil servants, or whose former husbands were foreign service of-
ficers, if the divorce occurred prior to February 15, 1981. 17 Even if the
retirees tried to provide survivor annuities for their former spouses, the
federal government will not pay annuities to those divorced widows.
Third, widows of former federal employees who die after leaving
12. By contrast, while employees in the private sector face loss of private pensions as a result of
mobility, their Social Security continues to be indexed.
13. As we go to press, President Reagan has suggested provisions designed to prevent retirees
from collecting duplicating federal pensions and Social Security.
14. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION POLICY, FINAL REPORT, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD A
NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 595 (1981) [hereinafter cited as TOWARD A NA-
TIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY].
15. 5 U.S.C.A. § 8339 (West Supp. 1981).
16. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES: NEED FOR OVERALL POLICY AND COORDINATED MANAGEMENT OF FED-
ERAL RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 2-5 (1978).
17. See Foreign Service Act of 1980, ch. 8, § 2206, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5055 (West Supp. 1981).
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federal service and before reaching retirement age. The law does not
cover the family of a former employee who dies before retiring.
Fourth, widows of certain federal employees or retirees whose pen-
sions are not indexed or are only partially indexed. This is the case for
the widows of most officers of the judiciary.'"
Fifth, those state and local employees who are not covered under
Social Security. As noted above,19 the state and local pensions that
they receive will rarely be indexed in full.
Until 1981 homemakers who were once married to railroad em-
ployees and later divorced or who remarried after being widowed by a
railroad worker were also excluded from any coverage. Fortunately,
this gap was filled by Title XI of the Budget Reconciliation Act.2°
PRIVATE PENSIONS
In 1976 only 12% of women sixty-five or older who had no husband
were receiving private pensions, the second leg of the stool. The com-
parable figure for men was 21%.21 The 12% figure included some wo-
men who were receiving survivor annuities based upon their husbands'
employment. Thus, an even smaller percentage were receiving pen-
sions based upon their own earnings.
Coverage
Fewer women than men are covered by private pension plans. A
1979 survey sponsored by the Social Security Administration (SSA)
and the Department of Labor (DOL) found that only 31% of women
workers were covered by a pension plan on their current jobs, com-
pared with 50% of men.2
There are many reasons why only a small proportion of women are
protected under private pension plans. First, pension law does not re-
quire an employer to offer a pension plan to its employees. In this re-
spect, pension law is unlike other laws govening labor conditions which
require covered employers to meet minimum standards, for example, to
18. S. 1403, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). This bill was introduced in the 97th Congress to im-
prove survivor annuities for the widows or widowers of federal judges. The bill is the result
of the work of a special judicial committee led by Judge Irving Kaufman. It would retain the
current provision giving survivors an increase of 3% for each 5% increase received by judges.
It makes no provision for divorced spouses. N.Y. Times, June 21, 1981, at 43, col. I.
19. Supra note 14.
20. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 § 1117, 45 U.S.C. § 231 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as OBRA].
21. THE CHANGING ROLES OF MEN AND WOMEN, supra note 6, at 177.
22. G. THOMPSON ROGERS, PENSION COVERAGE AND VESTING AMONG PRIVATE WAGE AND
SALARY WORKERS, 1979: PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES FROM THE 1979 SURVEY OF PENSION
PLAN COVERAGE (June 1980) (available from the Social Security Administration, Division of
Retirement and Survivors Studies) [hereinafter 1979 SURVEY]; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PAT-
TERNS OF WORKER COVERAGE BY PRIVATE PENSION PLANS (1980). The two publications
sometimes show different figures because SSA based its findings upon all workers while
DOL used only full-time workers. This article relies primarily upon the SSA figures.
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pay a minimum wage,2 3 provide safe and healthful working condi-
tions,24 give extra compensation for overtime work,25 and meet other
specified standards. 26 Pension law regulates plans only if an employer
first decides to provide a pension plan. The employer can avoid the
whole problem by deciding not to have a plan.
Collective bargaining and the desire for a tax shelter are the two
principal reasons that employers decide to establish pension plans, al-
though the stated justification is often the desire to attract and retain
employees. Most large employers are subject to collective bargaining
and have established plans in response to negotiation with labor un-
ions. Those employers who wish to obtain tax shelters can do so only if
they provide pensions for their employees proportionately as generous
as those payable to company managers, and otherwise in accordance
with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).27
Small employers look to their tax advisers to determine whether the tax
advantages are sufficient to warrant establishing new plans or to con-
tinue maintaining those already in operation. An indication of the di-
mension of the tax incentives can be found in the United States
Department of Treasury's estimate of revenue loss due to pension
plans; the figure for 1981 exceeds $20 billion.28
The SSA-DOL 1979 survey found that 79% of noncovered workers
(men and women) were excluded because they worked for companies
where pension plans were not available to employees. Women were
found to be employed in industries where pension plans were less com-
mon, particularly the trade and service industries. In addition, women
were found to be concentrated in occupations not covered under pen-
sion plans, even when they worked for employers with plans covering
employees in other occupations. Service workers, among whom wo-
men predominate, had the lowest probability of coverage. Clerical
workers were less likely to be covered than factory operatives, manag-
ers, or professional and technical workers.
Even when women were in the same occupation as men, the survey
found that they were less likely to be covered.29 One important reason
was that they were not as often protected by a union contract. Another
reason seems to be the size of the firm; coverage was substantially
higher among employees of large firms rather than small firms where
many women work.
Nevertheless, even when all these factors-industry, occupation,
union membership, and size of firm-were discounted, fewer women
23. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
24. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. 1II 1979).
25. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
26. Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 276(a)-276(a)(5) (1976).
27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); I.R.C. §§ 401, 404, 410, 411, 412; and re-
lated provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
28. OBRA supra note 20, Special Analysis 8, table G-1.
29. 1979 SuRvEY, supra note 22, at 14.
1981]
268 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 8:263
were covered than men.30 In part, this may be because women's labor
force participation is often interrupted in ways that cause their exclu-
sion from coverage.
ERISA does not require plans to cover employees who are under
age twenty-five, who have less than one year of service, or who work
fewer than 1000 hours during the year. If the plan provides for vest-
ing3 1 after three years, it may exclude employees from participation for
three years.32 Inasmuch as many women work while they are in their
early twenties, and then either work on a part-time schedule or leave
the labor force to raise a family, the uncovered years before age twenty-
five are important to them, as are periods of temporary or part-time
work later in life.33
Vesting
An employee who is covered under a plan and has accrued benefits
will receive a pension only if the right to the benefit is "vested," that is,
only if the employer's promise to pay the accrued benefits is not condi-
tioned upon the employee's continuous service for the employer until
retirement. Vesting is usually earned by years of service under the
plan. ERISA does not require vesting credit to be given in any year in
which the employee has less than 1000 hours of service, nor to an em-
ployee who is less than twenty-two years of age.34 (Note that this is
different from the age of required coverage, which is twenty-five.)
The rights of those who do have creditable service may vest under
one of several permissible formulas.35 The most common schedule for
large corporate plans is the "ten-year cliff," which requires vesting only
after the employee has worked ten years. 36 This rule, like all the cur-
rent vesting rules, has the effect of requiring short-term employees to
subsidize long-term employees, especially in profit-sharing plans where
forfeited funds originally earmarked for short-term employees are ulti-
mately paid to those who stay long enough to acquire vested rights. If
the employer adopts another type of plan under which there is no com-
30. Id. at 15.
31. Vested benefits are benefits which the employee will receive even if he leaves that employer's
employ before retirement age. See text accompanying notes 34-40 infra.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1976); I.R.C. § 410.
33. The proposed Women's Economic Equity Act of 1981 would lower the minimum age for
participation to 21. S. 888, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 3117, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(l)(A) (1976); I.R.C. § 41 1(a)(4).
35. The employer may, of course, provide an accelerated method of vesting, but most do not.
36. Small corporate plans may be required to provide 40% vesting after four years, followed by
annual increments, until full vesting is achieved after eleven years. An alternative vesting
schedule, the "graded" vesting formula, requires the plan to provide partial vesting after five
years but does not require full vesting for 15 years. A third vesting schedule, known as the
rule of 45," depends upon a combination of age and years of service; vesting begins when
the two total 45, and moves up by specified increments until full vesting is achieved when the
combination equals 55. There are other vesting schedules which permit delayed coverage
but require faster vesting; these are used primarily by plans covering teachers and by certain
other specialized types of plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1976); I.R.C. § 411.
Women's Retirement Income
parable use of forfeitures, the short-tenure employees may still subsi-
dize others indirectly because their salaries or wages are lower than
they would be if the employer was not contributing to a pension plan
that does not benefit them.
The 1979 survey revealed relatively small differences in vesting be-
tween men and women with comparable tenure on the job.37 Of those
covered under a pension plan 70% of men and 64% of woman age fifty-
five and over are vested.38 This represents, however, only 24% of wo-
men workers in that age bracket, as compared with 40% of men of com-
parable age.39 The gap in the vesting rates is almost entirely
attributable to length of service. Women do not stay on their jobs as
long as do men, for reasons that are generally related to their home
responsibilities.
Interruptions in service also interfere with vesting. Under ERISA, if
an employee leaves the job before vesting occurs, he or she must return
to the same plan in order to retain and add to the vesting credits ac-
quired during the years before the interruption. Therefore, unless the
employee was covered by a multi-employer plan, which generally exists
in only a few industries characterized by short job tenure and collective
bargaining, the employee must return to the same employer. Specifi-
cally, ERISA provides that if there is a break in service equal to the
period of service prior to the break, all prior service which has not yet
vested may be disregarded in determining whether the employee's pen-
sion is vested. 40 For example, if a woman has worked the four years
from ages twenty-two to twenty-six and then stops working to stay
home for four years, she may have to begin the vesting process all over
when she returns, even if she returns to the same job. Therefore, wo-
men who start work in their early twenties and then take time off to
raise children may lose their earlier credits toward vesting.
Amount of Pension Benefits
Women's pension benefits are generally lower than benefits payable
to men, primarily because the amount of a pension is generally related
to earnings. Women earn approximately 60% of men's average earn-
ings.41 One reason may be transitory: the number of middle-aged wo-
men in entry-level jobs is likely to decrease, though not disappear, as
their younger cohorts, who have made greater commitments to the la-
bor force at earlier ages, reach middle age. The second factor seems
less transitory: women in traditional female occupations are poorly
paid.
The way in which lower earnings can result in a smaller pension is
37. 1979 SURVEY, supra note 22, at 18.
38. Id. at 19.
39. Id. at 9.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(b)(3) (1976); I.R.C. § 41 1(a)(6).
41. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 3, table 690, at 419.
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illustrated by the following formula, typical for a defined benefit plan,
under which the pension consists of 1 1/2% of the average earnings of
the employee in his or her five best years, multi plied by the number of
years of employment. If a woman had a "high-5 average" of $8,618
(which was the median salary for women employed full-time and
throughout the year in 1977) and she had worked thirty years, she
would be entitled to an annual pension of $3,878 (.015 X $8,618 X 30).
By comparison, a man whose high-5 year earnings averaged $14,62642
(the median earnings for men employed full-time throughout the year
in the same year) and who had worked thirty years, would be entitled
to an annual pension of $6,581.70 (.015 x $14,626 x 30). In most cases
the discrepancy in pensions would be greater than in the illustration
because fewer women than men have worked thirty years creditable for
pension purposes.
Social Security Integration
Tax law withholds deductions from plans that discriminate in favor
of the highly paid; however, under the Social Security integration rules,
a plan is not deemed discriminatory merely because it fails to provide
both Social Security and a private pension on the same earnings. In-
stead, the Social Security "integration rules" permit employers to treat
Social Security taxes or benefits as though they were part of the em-
ployer's pension plan. The adverse impact of these provisions prima-
rily affects low-paid employees.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) approves several methods of
integrating plans with Social Security.43 Two more popular methods of
integration decrease the amount of private pension as the Social Secur-
ity wage and contribution (FICA) base rises. One, the "excess" method,
pays benefits only on earnings above "covered compensation," that is,
compensation above the weighted average of the FICA base during the
employee's working years counted for Social Security purposes. A va-
riant of this method, the "step-rate" method, pays benefits on earnings
below the covered compensation base at a rate as much as 37 1/2% less
than the rate applicable to earnings above the covered compensation
base.
Under the second integration rule, used primarily by defined contri-
bution plans (where the employer contributes a fixed proportion of the
employee's earnings), the employer contributes to the plan only on
earnings above the current FICA base.44
Because the FICA base is rising rapidly, the adverse impact of these
two methods of Social Security integration is growing. Since 1937 the
42. Id.
43. I.R.C. § 401(a)(5); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(e) (1981). For an excellent explanation of the inte-
gration rules, see D. GRUBBS, INTEGRATION OF PLANS WITH SOCIAL SECURITY (1979) (pub-
lished by the American Law Institute and American Bar Association).
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.403(e)(2)(iv) (1981).
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FICA base has risen incrementally from $3,000 to $29,700 in 1981, with
the major growth in the last few years. For an employee born in 1915,
the maximum covered compensation, important for either the excess or
step-rate method, is still only about $10,000 because during most of the
employee's working years, the FICA base was under $10,000, exceed-
ing that figure for the first time in 1973. Since 1977 the FICA base has
been zooming upwards. Thus, a pension plan integrated in this way
would concentrate benefits to a person who retired in 1980 on average
compensation at retirement age in excess of $10,000. As younger em-
ployees reach retirement age, however, the level of covered compensa-
tion will be much greater, reflecting the higher FICA base. In today's
dollars, assuming no further legislated changes in the FICA base, by
the year 2000 payment of benefits integrated under an excess plan will
not be mandatory for earnings under $17,000, and by 2010, when mem-
bers of the baby boom generation begin to reach retirement age, under
$22,000.
Under this integration rule too, the higher the FICA base, the more
wages that can be ignored for pension purposes. This means that more
benefits can be reduced, and larger numbers of persons "covered" by
the plan can lose their pensions.
The third method, the most popular, permits plans to reduce bene-
fits by a portion, up to 83 1/2%, of the Social Security benefit payable
to the same employee. Because Social Security benefits were propor-
tionately reduced by the 1977 Social Security amendments,45 the ad-
verse impact of this method of integration has also been reduced, at the
cost, however, of reducing the total retirement income payable to a re-
tiree. Most plans offset reductions by 50% rather than 83 1/2%, but any
reduction creates a problem. Moreover, this method is highly objec-
tionable because it permits a plan to withhold pension benefits on the
basis of Social Security benefits earned in employment not covered by
the pension plan.
Many employers take advantage of the integration rules and pro-
vide no benefits or greatly decreased benefits to low-paid employees.
Women are hit harder by integration than are men because they earn
substantially less.
Women's Entitlement As Wives
Traditionally, a pension has been viewed as owned entirely by the
employee. While in the past some plans offered retiring employees the
opportunity to provide survivor benefits to their spouses, many plans
made no such offer. When the option was available, participants may
not have known about it, and there was little encouragement from the
plan for them to choose it. The result was that few women received
45. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1509 (amending scattered
sections of 2, 26, 42, 45 U.S.C.).
19811
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survivor benefits. A pre-ERISA estimate was that less than 2% did so.46
ERISA made significant changes. The law now requires plans that
offer a life annuity to give employees the option of providing a survivor
benefit.47 In some situations, the survivors are entitled to a survivor
annuity unless the employee has elected otherwise; in other situations,
the employee must have made an affirmative election. The circum-
stances in which either form of election is available are, however, lim-
ited. As indicated above, the plan is not affected unless it offers the life
annuity form of benefit. The employee may be ineligible, unless he is
retired or has reached retirement age. In addition, the spouse is not
mandatorily eligible unless married to the employee for the year before
retirement and the year prior to death (thus excluding divorced spouses
and those to whom the employee is married after retirement). Finally,
the plan may require the employee to accept substantial reductions in
his benefit in order to pay for the spouse's benefit.48
Precise data on the extent to which these ERISA rules have resulted
in provision of survivor annuities to women are not available. The au-
thor has the impression from conversations with actuaries and pension
lawyers that hourly paid employees rarely make the election, but that
significant numbers of salaried workers and professionals do provide
for their spouses. Instead of survivor annuities, the latter group may
have defined contribution plans with vested account balances which go
to the spouses in the event of the employee's death. When this is the
case, the spouse is protected even if the spouse is not named for a survi-
vor annuity.
Another factor in evaluating the availability of spouse benefits is
the possibility that many employers make life insurance available in-
stead in the pre-retirement years. Because it is relatively inexpensive,
life insurance may be better for the survivor if she and the employee
are young. Moreover, it is payable in the full amount regardless of age,
while pension benefits may be actuarially reduced if the survivor is
young. Of course, life insurance, once spent, is not available for retire-
ment income, and, therefore, it may not be as adequate for the older
widow.
Finally, ERISA requires that the employee be given sufficient
financial information in order to make a fully informed election per-
taining to joint and survivor benefits.49 The complexity and adminis-
trative nuisance of this requirement is so onerous that many plan
designers avoid the joint and survivor option altogether. For example,
the IRS model plans for money-purchase and profit-sharing plans5" do
not contain a joint and survivor option; instead they offer either a lump
sum or 120 monthly payments to the retiree or his heir. The alterna-
46. Pension Rights Center, Pension Facts No. 2 (1979).
47. I.R.C. § 401(a)(1 1); 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1976).
48. Id.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c) (1976); I.R.C. § 1021(a)(l)(E).
50. [1976] PENS. COORDINATOR (TAX RESEARCH INST. OF AM.) 630, 670.
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tives may or may not provide protection for the surviving spouse, de-
pending upon whether she inherits the account balance, but the choice
of 120 monthly payments (a type of ten-year-certain form of payment)
raises other problems. In the case of either an employee who retires at
age sixty-five and lives to the age of 80 or older or his widow who lives
as long or longer, this type of ten-year certain may mean destitution
when the ten-year period ends.
SAVINGS
The third leg of the stool is private savings. Although approxi-
mately half of women sixty-five and over who were living without hus-
bands in 1976 had investment income, their average income from this
source was very small: only $340 in interest from savings and only
$1,660 from other investments. 5'
A tax incentive to save specifically for retirement is provided
through an Individual Retirement Account or annuity (IRA), estab-
lished under section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code. This provision
permits an employee to make a tax-deductible contribution to a special
account and to defer taxes on the interest earned by the account until
retirement.52 Because the earnings are compounded regularly on a tax-
free basis, money in an IRA can multiply astonishingly over a period of
years.
Data on participation in IRA's are imprecise,53 but it is apparent
that relatively few persons eligible to make contributions-probably
less than 4%--have actually done so in the past. These persons, the
Department of Treasury reported in 1979, are disproportionately
drawn from the wealthy. Over 50% of those eligible with incomes of
$50,000 or more make contributions to IRA's, compared to less than
5% of those with incomes below $20,000.14 The figures are not surpris-
ing. Persons with incomes below $20,000, or even $30,000, are likely to
need their earnings to live on, especially in inflationary times, and are
far less interested in avoiding taxation than are persons of higher in-
come for whom taxes are proportionately more significant.
The Reagan Administration supported major changes in the IRA
rules to encourage savings which were included in the Economic Re-
covery Tax Act of 1981.5§ Those of greatest interest to women include
51. THE CHANGING ROLES OF MEN AND WOMEN, supra note 6, at 176-77.
52. These contributions may not be made earlier than age 59 1/2 and may not begin later than
age 70 1/2.
53. The SSA-DOL survey found that some persons who are covered by private pension plans
report that they are also contributing to IRA's, a clearly unauthorized practice.
54. Employee Contributions to IR4s and Other Pension Plans. Hearings on S. 75, S. 94, S. 209,
and S. 557 Before the Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans and Employee Fringe Benefits of the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 113, 124-25 (1979) (statement of Dan
Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 75,
S 94, S 209, and S. 557].
55. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 311, 95 Stat. - (to be codified in
scattered sections at 26 U.S.C.).
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the following:
First, IRA's may now be established by and receive contributions
from persons who are active participants in another plan. This means
that women employed in short-duration jobs, which group includes
most employed women, may contribute to an IRA and thus be assured
of retirement income even if they do not stay on the job long enough to
vest in the employer's plan. While this change is an improvement, it is
not likely to be a major help to most women whose earnings from full-
time employment in 1980 averaged 60% of men's,5 6 because few have
the excess income to make contributions. Thus it is far from clear that
the eligibility of women who are active participants in a plan to estab-
lish IRAs will result in many employed women actually doing so.
Second, a major change raised the maximum contribution by an
individual worker from $1,500 to $2,000 a year. At the same time the
previous limitation of 15% on the proportion of earnings that may be
contributed was dropped. Thus, the new law permits a woman earning
only $2,000 a year to contribute her entire earnings to an IRA.
Whether she will do so is another matter.
Third, the rules on spousal IRA's were changed. Under previous
law an individual could allocate half of his IRA contribution to his
non-working spouse's account. Anyone accepting this option was al-
lowed a tax deduction for additional contributions up to $250 above
the $1500 maximum." This provision provided an incentive to any
husband who wanted the full tax deduction to contribute $875 toward
his wife's IRA account. There is no known data on the number of
spousal IRA's established since they were first authorized in 1977.
Under 1981 law the maximum contribution to a spousal IRA was
increased from $1,750 to $2,250, but the requirement that half of the
contribution be credited to the non-working spouse was deleted. This
means that a worker taking full advantage of the right to contribute to
a spousal IRA no longer needs to contribute $875 to his spouse's ac-
count, but can receive the maximum tax advantage if he contributes
only $250 to her account, while contributing $2,000 to his own.
Fourth, certain divorced wives were made eligible to contribute
unearned income to an IRA. 8 Specifically, the law now allows di-
vorced women who had IRA's of their own, whether spousal or regular,
at least five years prior to the divorce, to make tax deductible contribu-
tions of alimony, or of alimony and earnings combined, up to a maxi-
mum of $1,125 a year, provided their former spouses had contributed
to the IRA for at least three of the most recent five years. It seems
unlikely that many divorced women will be able to take advantage of
this new opportunity, both because they will not have received the req-
56. MONEY, INCOME, AND POVERTY STATUS, supra note 2, table 13.
57. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 220, 90 Stat. 1734.
58. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 311, 95 Stat. - (to be codified in
scattered sections at 26 U.S.C.).
[Vol. 8:263
Women'-s Retirement Income
uisite contributions from husbands in the years just before divorce, and
because they will not be paid sufficient alimony in the years after.
These changes in IRA law will probably help some women, but
whether they will do so in proportion to the cost to the United States
Treasury is doubtful. An indication of the relationships can be gleaned
from a 1979 Department of Treasury estimate that the amendment per-
mitting active participants in other plans to make deductible contribu-
tions to IRA's of the then maximum of $1500 would have led to a
revenue loss of $1.1 billion; of this amount $850 million would have
constituted added deductions for savings already being made on a non-
deductible basis.59 The revenue loss from the 1981 amendments is
likely to exceed this estimate. For reasons just outlined, the amend-
ments are unlikely to provide commensurate increases in retirement se-
curity for women. Thus, from the perspective of women, other uses of
the federal money involved could have provided better protection.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Substantial improvements are needed in the systems comprising all
three legs of the retirement-income stool: Social Security and other
federal pensions, private plans, and savings.
A. Social Security and Other Federal Pensions
First, coverage of indexed, retirement-income programs provided
by the federal government must be expanded to include those employ-
ees and their spouses who are now unprotected. Without this basic im-
provement, many women will continue to be without indexed pensions
in old age, if they have any pension at all.
Second, Social Security must be reformed to provide equity and ad-
quacy for married women workers, widows, and divorcees. Since de-
fects in Social Security for women are addressed in another article in
this issue,' they will not be discussed here.
B. Private Pensions
Efforts to obtain greater coverage for women under private pension
plans are essential. The President's Commission on Pension Policy has
recommended universal private pension coverage;6' this is but one pos-
sible approach. Efforts to obtain equality for women in the market-
place should also have a salutary effect.
Most importantly, ERISA must be amended to provide faster vest-
ing. A gradual phasing-in of shorter vesting periods might help plans
59. Hearings on S. 75, S. 94, S. 209, and S. 557, supra note 54, at 113, 124-25 (statement of Dan
Halperin).
60. Kaltenbom, Social Security: A Proposal to Improve Equity and Adequacy for Women, 8 J.
LEGIS. 250 (1981).
61. TOWARD A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY, supra note 14, at 42.
1981]
Journal of Legislation
adjust. If such a change were accompanied by a requirement that re-
signing employees with vested benefits "roll" their entitlements over
into an IRA or a central fund maintained by the government, the
money would be kept for retirement income. At present, if the plan
allows withdrawal of the vested benefits, may vested employees spend
their assets immediately. A rollover requirement would also avoid un-
due administrative burdens on employers and employees who might
otherwise have to find each other years later as individual short-term
employees reach retirement age.62 Finally, although immediate or one-
year vesting would obviously benefit women (and men) employees, if
pension plan administrators can show that pension funds would suffer
if required to maintain liquidity to permit withdrawal by short---tenure
employees,63 a slightly longer period might be considered.
Integration of private pensions with Social Security must be more
stringently regulated than at present, particularly since the increase in
the FICA base may otherwise lead to corresponding decreases in
many private pensions.64 The President's Commission on Pension Pol-
icy recommended change; unfortunately, its proposals were not ex-
plicit. One clearly needed reform is the limitation of permitted offsets
to Social Security earned on the same job as the pension being
decreased.
More data are needed on life insurance as a substitute for survivor
annuities. Proposals for ERISA amendments could then be tailored to
assure that widows get one or the other. Even without these data, how-
ever, it is clear that (1) ERISA election procedures should be simplified
to eliminate the current disincentive which results from complexity, for
plans to offer the joint and survivor form of benefit; (2) post-retirement
survivor benefits should be made mandatory, unless waived by the em-
ployee's spouse; (3) joint and survivor requirements should be strength-
ened to assure protection to those women whose husbands die before
reaching retirement age; and (4) plans should be required to offer pro-
tection for those divorcees whose husbands elect it or are ordered to do
so by a court.
C. Savings
Although saving for retirement should be encouraged, many wo-
men cannot afford it. Furthermore, it would be counterproductive if
IRA's were to replace tax-qualified employer pension plans which are
subject to the rules against discrimination. For these reasons liberaliza-
62. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE VESTING REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR PRIVATE PENSIONS 15 (1980).
63. TOWARD A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY, supra note 14, at 45.
64. The proposed Women's Economic Equity Act also includes this provision. Women's Eco-
nomic Equity Act of 1981, S. 888, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 3117, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981).
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tion of the IRA rules should proceed slowly. Moreover, once vesting is
improved, liberalization would not be as necessary as it seems today.
Despite these doubts, it would seem appropriate to permit home-
makers to purchase IRA's with unearned income. The proposed Wo-
men's Economic Equity Act would allow women to purchase IRA's
based upon their husbands' earnings.65 If this change were adopted,
married women could save out of those assets available to them, and
divorced women could contribute from alimony monies without com-
plying with the narrow conditions of the 1981 law.
65. Id. § 101.
1981]
